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ENFORCING DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS UNDER FEDERAL
RULE 34: THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN LAW ON THE
CONCEPT OF CONTROL*
FEDERAL Rule of Civil Procedure 34 authorizes a court, at the request of
a litigant showing good cause, to order pre-trial discovery of relevant docu-
ments in the "possession, custody, or control" of an opposing party.' If the
discovery order is disobeyed Rule 37(b) allows the court to impose "just"
sanctions against the disobedient party including striking of his pleadings,
dismissal, or entry of default judgment.2 When the party from whom the
papers are sought (the deponent) has no control over them, no discovery
order can issue, and the party seeking discovery (the proponent) must pro-
ceed to trial without inspecting the documents. s Whether a party controls
*Soci~t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953).
1. Fm). R. Civ. P. 34 provides:
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefore and upon notice to all other
parties ... the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers .... or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence . . . and which are in his possession, custody, or con-
trol .... 
Rule 34 requires a court order before discovery may be made. The order does not
issue automatically upon proponent's motion; granting discovery involves an exercise of
the court's discretion. Hudalla v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 10 F.R.D. 363 (D. Minn.
1950).
For a general treatment of Rule 34, see 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcric f 34.01 (2d ed.
1950).
2. FE. R. Cirv. P. 37(b) (2) provides:
"If any party . . . refuses to obey an order made under... Rule 34 ... the court may
make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:
"(i) an order that the matters [which] ... the contents of the paper [allegedly prove]
... shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order;
"(ii) an order . . . prohibiting [the disobedient party] from introducing in evidence
designated documents...
"(iii) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party. .. "
3. Although Rule 34 only requires that the deponent have possession, custody, or
control, courts have held that control is the real test, since emphasis merely on possession
or custody could contravene the spirit of the Rule. Bifferato v. States Marine Corp. of
Delaware, 11 F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); In re Harris, 27 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(designated bank records were physically in the deponent's possession; but the court,
interpreting the National Banking Act, found that he had no legal control over the records
and withdrew its discovery order).
NOTES
designated documents is a question of fact.4 Courts have never found control
when the documents sought were lost,0 destroyed," or otherise unavailable
to the deponent.7
In Socitgt Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. McGranery,8 a court considered for the first time whether the operation
of foreign law should be a factor in determining if a party has control over
documents. Plaintiff, a Swiss corporation, sued to recover property seized
by the United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act.0 On the
Government's motion, the court ordered plaintiff to produce its corporate
records, which were located in Switzerland.'0  Swiss penal law, however, for-
bade disclosure of such information." And to prevent compliance with the
4. Courts have consistently held that proponent's right to a discovery order is con-
ditioned upon his showing, inter alia, that deponent has control over the requested docu-
ments. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 11 F.R.D. 487 (NIT.D. Pa. 1951);
Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 8 F.R.D. 11 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
5. Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
6. Roth v. Paramount Pictures Distributing Corp., S F.R.D. 31 (W.D. Pa. 1943).
7. Reeves v. Pennsylvania R.R., 80 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Del. 194S) (deponent had
no legal power to compel her doctor to give her X-rays which proponent sought) ; Valen-
stein v. Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1946) (deponent had sold the
items designated in the discovery order before he brought suit) ; Blumenthal v. Lukacs,
2 F.R.D. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (the designated corporate records, if ex.tant, were in Hun-
gary, and not in deponent's control).
8. 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953) (hereinafter cited as Socit6 Internationale v.
McGraner3y), 66 HAnv. L. REv. 1316. Subsequent to this decision Attorney-General
Brownell, M.%r. McGranery's successor, has been substituted as defendant in the case.
9. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), as amended, 55 STAT. 839 (1941), 50 U.S.C.APP. § 1 (1946).
Section 9(a) of the Act provides that any person---except an enemy or an enemy ally-
with an interest in money or property vested in the United States Government under
authority of the Act may file a claim to recover his property. For a detailed study of the
provisions relating to the return of seized property, see Comment, 62 YALE Lj. 1210
(1953).
10. The United States claimed the records would show that corporate control of the
plaintiff rested in enemy hands; plaintiff argued that the records would prove its neutral
9wnership and were therefore of more importance to it than to the defendant. SociCt
Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 442 (D.D.C. 1953).
11. In complying with the discovery order, the deponent would have violated three
Swiss penal statutes.
The Economic Espionage Act makes it a crime to reveal a "business secret" to a
"foreign official" or his agent. Swiss ProNAL CoDy Art. 273 (1942). Defendant claimed
that plaintiff could induce its depositors to waive this provision. But the court-appointed
Master concluded that waivers would be ineffectual, since government as well as private
business secrets were involved. SPECIAL MASTER's REroRr, Opinioni pp. 121-5; Findings
of Fact Nos. 26-8, 107-137 (July 9, 1952), Socit6 Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F.
Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953).
The Banking Act imposes penalties on a bank officer or employee who wilfully divulges
bank secrets. Swiss BANKING Acr Art. 47 (1934). Although depositors can also waive
this statute, the Master found that the thousands of records involved in this case made it
practically impossible for plaintiff to procure waivers. SPECIAL MASTIS Rx-Roa, op. Cit.
supra, Opinion pp. 130-1; Findings of Fact Nos. 133-42; Conclusions Nos. 9, 10.
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discovery order, Swiss authorities seized the documents.12 The court accepted
a Master's finding that plaintiff was in no way responsible for the taking and
had made bona fide efforts to produce the records. 18 Nevertheless, choosing
to ignore Swiss seizure, the court found that plaintiff had control over its
records.1" Hence, it dismissed the complaint with prejudice because plaintiff,
despite its good faith, had failed to comply with the discovery order.15
Finally, a general section of the penal statutes forbids any unauthorized person to
undertake on Swiss territory any action in behalf of an official of a foreign government
-or to abet such action. Swiss PENAL CODE Art. 271 (1942). To avoid violating this
Article, plaintiff would have had to receive the Swiss government's permission to comply
with the discovery order. No permission was granted. SPECIAL MASTER's RE oRT, op. Cit.
supra, Opinion pp. 18-20; Findings of Fact Nos. 11-18.
12. For the full text of the seizure order, see SPECIAL MASTER'S REoRT, op. cit.
supra note 11, Opinion pp. 2-3. The court described the seizure as "constructive posses-
sion by interdiction" and not a "physical taking," Soci~t6 Internationale v. McGranery,
111 F. Supp. 435, 439 (1952), and the Special Master found that production or an attempt
to produce was theoretically not impossible although it would constitute an additional
crime under Swiss law. SPEcI. MAsTr's RErORT, op. cit. mtpra note 11, Finding0s of
Fact No. 5. However, the Swiss Federal Attorney's seizure order entrusts the Federal
police with its execution, and neither defendant nor the court contended that plaintiff
actually could have produced the records covered by the order. Indeed the court, in an-
nouncing the grounds for its decision, stated: "The principle is the same, whether the
information is locked in the breast of a party by a foreign government's order or whether
it is locked in its chests or vaults by the same government order." Soci~t6 Internationale
v. McGranery, supra, at 444. This Note will proceed on the assumption that for all prac-
tical purposes the Swiss government had in fact seized the documents.
The preventive police power, which made seizure possible, stems from Art, 102, § 10 of
the Swiss Constitution and from customary Swiss law. It gives the Federal Attorney the
right to forestall imminent violations of any section of the Penal Code or the Banking
Law. SPECIAL MAsTrE's REPORT, op. cit. supra note 11, Findings of Fact Nos. 77-97.
13. The Special Master held hearings on eighteen separate occasions, considered
numerous exhibits, and took testimony from plaintiff's officers and from experts on Swiss
law. SPECIAL MAsTER's REPORT, op. cit. supra note 11, Opinimt p. 5. He concluded that
plaintiff had demonstrated its good faith by making the efforts a "reasonable man would
make who desired to achieve effective compliance with [the] Court's order." Id., Conchisionis
Nos. 2, 7; Findings of Fact Nos. 25-43. He also determined that under Swiss law the
seizure order was justified, and that the Swiss government had not altered the customary
operation or enforcement of its laws to aid the plaintiff. Id. Nos. 4, 5.
14. Socit6 Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 438, 442 (D.D.C. 1953).
The court had found that plaintiff had control of the records when it first issued the
discovery order. Soci~t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commer-
ciales, S.A. v. Clark, 9 F.R.D. 263 (D.D.C. 1949).
15. The dismissal was to take effect on June 15, 1953, unless plaintiff produced the
documents in the interim. See order entered by the court, March 31, 1953, subsequent to
Socift6 Internationale v. McGranery, supra note 14. But because plaintiff was appealing
the seizure order to the Swiss Federal Council, the court postponed the effective date of
dismissal until July 15, 1953. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1953, p. 39, col. 5.
The court in Socifti TIternatiomde framed the issue presented for decision in terms
of a non-complying plaintiff, Socigt6 Internationale v. McGranery, supra at 443. But




In Soci&t9 Titernationale, the documents sought had not been seized when
the court first ordered the plaintiff to produce them.', The court might then
have found control on the ground that plaintiff did physically possess the
records, even though revealing their contents would have violated Swiss
law.17 But ordering discovery in such a situation would force many litigants
into the hapless choice betveen forfeiting their lawsuit in this country by
disobeying the order and incurring substantial criminal or civil liability abroad
for performing an unlawful act.' Courts have never directed a party to
commit an unlawful act.'9 Consequently, they should not issue a discovery
16. The court issued its discovery order on July 5, 1949 and ordered the designated
documents produced on June 29, 1950. The Swiss Government issued its seizure order
two weeks prior to the 1950 deadline. Soci t Internationale v. McGranery, Ill F. Supp.
435, 438 (D.D.C. 1953).
17. See note 11 supra. The court seemed to be aware when it issued the order that
difficulties might arise under Swiss law:
"If it develops that plaintiff, after bona fide efforts to obtain access to [the
designated] records... is unable to produce them as ordered, the question
of whether further action should be taken by the Court may be considered."
Socid6t Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Clar:,
9 F.R.D. 263, 265 (D.D.C. 1949).
18. In any case where the court issues a discovery order, and compliance would be
illegal under foreign law, deponent theoretically has a free choice either to comply with
the court order or to stay within his own country's law. But practically speaLing the dice
may be loaded. Where the deponent has discovered that compliance will be unlawful, his
subsequent act of production will be u4ifulky illegal under foreign law and may subject
him to additional punishment. SPECIAL A esf.ST'S RFoRr, op. cit. .spra note 11, Findings
of Fact No. 28. On the other hand, if he fails to inquire about foreign law and subse-
quently refuses to comply with the discovery order his good faith will become suspect
in United States courts.
The deponent's dilemma can arise from potential liability in a civil suit as well as
from threatened punishment under criminal law. In many instances, paying heavy damages
to an injured party might be more burdensome to a deponent than paying a light fine to
his government.
19. A court clearly has power to order litigants to perform acts outside its territorial
jurisdiction, but it can exercise the power only "provided such [acts are] not contrary to
the law of the state in which [they are] to be performed." REsTATE!=S.T, CozFLIc's oy
LAws § 94 (1934). One case has expressly applied the REsTArmEr's rule to an act
illegal under foreign law. Mexican law prohibited removal of the deponent's records from
his place of business, and the court refused to order the deponent to violate that law.
It held that if the proponent wished to inspect the records, it had to go to Mexico. SEC
v. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945). The only other decision directly
bearing on this question held that plaintiff was not entitled to inspect defendant's records,
since inspection would violate the Business Records Protection Act of Ontario. Hirsh-
horn v. Hirshhorn, 105 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1951) (memorandum decision). There are also
some dicta indicating that courts will not force litigants to choose allegiance between
court orders and conflicting foreign laws. See Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 293, 303
(1878); Harris v. Pullman, 84 IlL 20, 28 (1876).
In Socijtj Intervatonale, the court distinguished the Minas de Artcemisa case, .rupra,
as dealing only with "accommodation and convenience" and not with "ultimate prcduc-
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order if compliance would require him to do so. In some instances, of course,
foreign law would subject the deponent only to a small fine or other mild
sanction. Then, if the interests at stake in the suit are great and discovery is
important to its outcome, a United States court might reasonably require the
deponent to produce the documents and suffer the consequences.20
But by the time the court delivered its opinion in Socit Internationale,
the Swiss government had actually seized the designated documents. 2' In
holding that plaintiff still controlled the papers, the court abandoned estab-
lished interpretation of "control." Previously, courts had examined all the
facts to determine whether the deponent was actually able to produce the
documents. 22 Had this court used that approach, it could not have dismissed
the complaint, because Swiss seizure had in fact deprived plaintiff of physical
power to comply with the discovery order.
The court departed from precedent partially because it did not want foreign
law to "frustrate" domestic rules of procedure. 23 To be sure, a foreign liti-
gant seeking relief in a United States court must comply with its procedure. "
But if, as previously held, Rule 34 instructs the court to decide whether il
tion." Soci~t6 Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 445 (D.D.C. 1953). But
the de Artemisa opinion nevertheless squarely refused to order performance of an illegal
act.
Sociiti In-termationale analogized performance of an illegal act to self-incrimination.
It pointed out that the privilege against self-incrimination does not protect a witness from
giving evidence which may lead to his conviction under the laws of another jurisdiction.
Soci~t6 Internationale v. McGranery, supra at 444, See also United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1931). The analogy does not seem apt. Forcing a deponent to perform an
illegal act "creates guilt" where none existed before. But forcing a witness to testify
can at most illuminate an offense which the witness had previously committed of his own
volition.
20. Several countries have laws similar to those invoked in the Soc ti In!ternationale
case, including Canada, Finland and Italy. See communications and reference material on
file in Yale Law Library.
The preventive police power is a control "familiar to the European systems of con-
stitutional law." Brief for Plaintiff, August 21, 1951, p. 17, Soci~t6 Internationale v.
McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953). Where a foreign government can exercise
such a power to impound documents the practical distinction between illegality and actual
seizure may be negligible. The government can seize as soon as it realizes that one of
its nationals, under orders from an American court, contemplates an illegal action.
21. See note 16 supra.
22. See notes 4-7 supra and accompanying text.
23. "It seems obvious that foreign law cannot be permitted to obstruct the
investigation and discovery of facts in a case, under rules established as
conducive to the proper and orderly administration of justice in a court of
the United States ...
"To adopt any ... course [other than enforcement of the discovery order]
would lead only to frustration and nullification of established procedures...
and ... impose foreign procedure in trial of suits in United States Courts."
Soci~t6 Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953).
24. See GooDIUcH, Co Nrcrs oF LAws § 80 (3d ed. 1949).
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fact the deponent has control, the effect of foreign seizure seems peculiarly
relevant. To consider the seizure is not to "apply" foreign law; it is merely
to accept a pertinent fact. 5
While a policy solicitous of domestic litigants' rights can be justified, undue
harshness to deserving foreign parties should be avoided. Socijt Intcrna-
tion le expresses a fear that consideration of the effects of foreign law would
enable a foreign litigant to "hide behind" the legislative protection of his
government..2 6 And even in the absence of collusion with a foreign govern-
ment, or bad faith, recognition of foreign law might give such litigants, as
well as Americans with documents located abroad, an unfair advantage
over domestic adversaries.27 But as Rule 34 now reads, it gives no hint
that courts should ignore the operation of foreign law in such situations.P
Although Socijt Internationale specifically adopted a finding of no collusion,
it nevertheless seems to create a conclusive presumption of collusion or bad
faith.29 But, by this court's own standards, the deponent can be given the
25. Ironically, the Socit6 Internationcle court, in its resolution to prevent foreign law
from interfering in American procedure, made Swiss seizure the sole ground for over-
throwing the established construction of Rule 34.
26. "[An opposite result] would permit a foreign government to release only
the documents favorable to one party and to retain or destroy the rest...
[and] to stipulate the conditions under which documents Tequired in a court
of the United States might he released.... It might defeat the purposes
of the Trading with the Enemy Act by permitting a foreign national to bring
suit in this country to recover property seized under the Act and then seek
shelter under the protective cloak of its government when discovery is
sought."
Socit6 Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953).
In parts of its opinion, the court seems strongly influenced by the peculiar nature of
the Act under which the suit is brought and elsewhere emphasizes the "privilege!' which
has been conferred upon plaintiff in permitting it as an alien to bring suit against the
United States. The broad grounds for the opinion, however, could pertain to any foreign
litigant, whatever the nature of his suit. "The question is when, upon the exercise of this
sovereign power [of a foreign country to pass laws], it becomes impossible for a subject
to comply with established procedures in this court for securing evidence, should this
court permit trial of the case?" Id. at 443-4.
27. "[A contrary decision] would permit a foreign party to be placed in a favored
position by the laws or action of his government." Id. at 444.
28. See note 1 supra.
29. See text at note 13, and note 26 supra. In light of much of the decision, it is
difficult to see just why the court directed the Special Master to determine the good faith
of plaintiff and its government. Sochdt Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles
et Commerciales, S.A. v. Clark, 11 F.R.D. 294, 297 (D.D.C. 1951), or why it adopted his
findings. Socit6 Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953). Once
the court finds good faith, there is no justification for considering the danger of collusion
further. Good faith depends on the facts of each case; abstract admonitions will be of
little help to future courts.
A good faith finding should involve careful consideration of the deponents original
motivation in locating his records in a country whose law precludes compliance with a
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burden of proving his own good faith and that of the foreign government.a0
So a foreign party or non-resident American could not profit from whatever
difficulties arise in bringing forth evidence of activities carried on abroad.31
A discovery order, however, is a feeble tool unless it can be enforced by
adequate sanctions. When applied to a deponent whose failure to produce
documents results solely from foreign seizure, the most drastic sanctions
presently available under Rule 37(b) may be unconstitutional, as well as
inequitable, in many instances. 32  Dismissing the deponent's complaint or
rendering default judgment against him has been held constitutional only
when his non-compliance was deliberate.83 Then the "proven" fact of his
discovery order. Should the court find that the deponent sought thereby to immunize his
records from future inspection, it should find bad faith, even though the deponent Is
presently powerless to produce the records.
For a contention that questions of good faith and collusion should not enter into the
court's decision at all, see 66 H~av. L. REv. 1316, 1317 (1953).
30. Socidt6 Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 439, 440 (D.D.C. 1953),
SPECIAL MAsTa's REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 11, Conclusion No. 1. Since the deponent is
likely to have in his possession most of the evidence bearing on his own good faith and
that of the foreign government, placing the burden of proof on him seems just.
31. Admittedly, it is difficult to determine the deponent's good faith in acting under
foreign law. An American court or Master, holding hearings on the subject, faces prodi-
gious obstacles, including language barriers, unavailability of witnesses, and the "diplo-
matic" embarrassment which questioning the good faith of a foreign government might
occasion. See generally, Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Lazo, 50 YAu LJ,
1018 (1941).
32. The Constitution seems to forbid use in this context of any sanction adjudicating
the merits of the case. See notes 36, 37 infra and accompanying text. This category in-
cludes all the sanctions enumerated in Rule 37(b), except staying proceedings and dis-
missing a complaint without prejudice. For the Rule's list of sanctions, see note 2 supra,
Rule 37 authorizes dismissal in general terms only. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (iii). But Rule
41 provides that a court's dismissal shall constitute an adjudication of the merits, unless
the court specifies otherwise. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Granting a stay can never be a final adjudication. In theory, neither can a dismissal
without prejudice, since it allows the plaintiff to reinstitute his suit. If, however, the
court's dismissal is timed so that the limitations period will run before the plaintiff can
bring suit again, the court's action actually amounts to an adjudication of the merits,
This is especially true where, as in SociWt Intenwtjonale, plaintiff can pursue his claim
in no other forum. A court anxious to enforce its discovery order might justify such a
dismissal on the ground that it does not technically adjudicate the merits. But dismiss-
ing so that plaintiff cannot sue again seems to do indirectly that which would be uncon-
stitutional if accomplished by frankly dismissing with prejudice. See note 36 infra and
accompanying text.
Staying proceedings and dismissing without prejudice may often be unsatisfactory
methods of dealing with a recalcitrant deponent. In Sociiti Internationale, for example,
any delay in the suit would have hindered the United States, since the Government could
not have disposed of property involved in the litigation until a final adjudication was made.
See Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 1210, 1214 n.28 (1953).
33. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); cf. Duell v. Duell,
178 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1949). But ef. Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897). The
Reviser's Note on Rule 37(b) makes it evident that the Rule was intended to derive its
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"wilful suppression of material evidence" gives reason to presume conclusively
that his pleadings are untrue. 4 Hence, they can be stricken. 3 But where
non-compliance is involuntary, a court cannot reasonably infer that the de-
ponent's pleadings are without basis in fact.30 And no alternative rationale
appears to validate denying the involuntary transgressor his constitutionally-
secured right to have his case adjudicated on its merits.U7 Moreover, when
constitutional validity from the Hammond case. AvIsoRy Commrrra's Nom To FED. R.
Civ. P. 37(b). Although they do not e.\-pressly discuss constitutionality, later cases inter-
preting the Rule have held that its sanctions apply only to wilful disobedience. Campbell
v. Johnson, 101 F. Supp. 705, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Roth v. Paramount Pictures Dis-
tributing Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31, 32 (XV.D. Pa. 1948).
34. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, supra note 33; see Anvxsony Co-m rrze's
NolE To Fro. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Both the case and the Note go to considerable effort
to distinguish Hovey v. Elliot, supra note 33, which held the rendering of a default judg-
ment unconstitutional The distinction employed in both instances was that in Hovey
the defendant's answer was stricken as a punishment for contempt, not as the result of
a reasonable presumption of untruth. See Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, supra nute
33, at 349-51. In Hovey, the court entered default judgment because the defendant failed
to pay money into court when ordered to do so. Sce Hovey v. Elliot, supra note 33, at
411-12. In Hammond, the court entered default judgment because the defendant failed
to produce documents when ordered to do so. Sec Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas,
supra note 33, at 336-40. Apparently the differences between the two cases are more
conceptual than real.
35. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, supra note 33.
36. In such a case, the deponent has not "vilfully suppressed" the documents. The
mere fact that factors beyond the deponent's control prevent compliance provides no
reasonable basis for an inference that his pleadings are worthless. Striking the deponent's
pleadings then becomes a denial of due process as outlined in Hovey v. Elliot, supra note
33. And taking as established the facts which the proponent alleges the unavailable dccu-
ments would prove seems to deny due process under the same rationale. See note 2
s2upra.
In Socit Internatioucle, the court stated that the constitutionality of its action was
assured by the Hammond case. Socidt Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435,
446, 447 (D.D.C. 1953). But the Hammond court specifically limited its decision to
deliberate non-compliance. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 346-7
(1909). Also to justify its decision, the Socit t Ilemnationale court interpreted Rule
37(b) as applying to non-wilful, as well as wilful, disobedience, and found that the de-
ponent had "refused" to obey the discovery order within the meaning of the Rule. Socit6
Internationale v. McGranery, supra at 446. Even assuming that such a distorted inter-
pretation could be defended, determining the meaning of the Rule does not decide its
constitutionality. The opinion also relied heavily on English precedents. Id. at 444-5.
It is difficult to see how British courts could possibly write decisions relevant to the
-alidity of Rule 37 under the United States Constitution.
37. In general, a litigant has a right to a hearing on the merits of his case. Con-
solidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. 150, 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906); Hovey v. Elliot,
167 U.S. 409, 415 (1897). A few cases have dismissed a party without affording him an
adjudication on the merits, but all involve situations distinguishable from that in SociIW
Inter aionale. One decision held that a state can by statute close its courts to an insur-
ance company by forcing the company to arbitrate contract claims. Hardware Dealers
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931). But there the court
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the court has found that the deponent tried in good faith to procure the
designated documents, it seems harsh to subject him to sanctions which were
designed to penalize only the wilfully disobedient.38
A court may nevertheless feel that a proponent whom foreign seizure has
robbed of possibly crucial documentary evidence deserves some assistance in
formulating his case. If the deponent does not already bear the burden of
proving facts contained in the unavailable documents, the court could con-
stitutionally put it upon him.3 9 At least with regard to some issues, the
difficulty of producing reliable evidence would put teeth in this sanction. A
more frequently effective means of aiding the proponent would be to tax the
deponent for costs the proponent reasonably incurs in searching elsewhere
relied on the fact that arbitral process satisfied constitutional requirements by affording
the company reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. Id. at 158.
In Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), the Court, without mention of any
constitutional issue, held that plaintiff could not maintain a claim based upon a con-
fidential contract between himself and the President of the United States. The Court
seemed to apply an estoppel rationale; it pointed out that plaintiff must have known that
the contract was privileged at the time he entered into it. Id. at 106. Socit Internationale
clearly does not present a comparable situation. Plaintiff's suit was specifically authorized
by the Trading with the Enemy Act. See note 9 supra. By no stretch of the imagination
had he contracted away this right to sue.
Some courts have held that a husband's divorce action will be dismissed if he fails to
comply with a court order to pay his wife temporary alimony and attorney fees so that she
may defend the suit. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 70 Neb. 779, 98 N.W. 73 (1904). But such
cases involve a wilful failure to comply. When non-compliance is involuntary, the most
any court has done is to stay proceedings. E.g., Farrar v. Farrar, 45 Cal. App. 584, 188
Pac. 289 (1920). And other courts have expressly held that striking the husband's
pleadings when he fails to pay is a denial of due process. Naveja v. Naveja, 110 Misc.
279, 179 N.Y. Supp. 881 (1920), citing Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897). And it
seems to be an established doctrine that a defendant husband cannot be forced to suffer
default judgment for failure to comply, even when his failure is wilful. E.g., Hutchinson
v. Hutchinson, 126 Ore. 519, 270 Pac. 484 (1928).
38. See ADvisoRY Com=r r2s Nom To FE. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
39. Determining what facts documents would prove if they were produced may involve
some guesswork. The proponent may seek to inspect them merely on the chance that they
might reveal something to support his case. But Rule 34 specifies that he must show good
cause for inspection and requires the court to exercise its discretion in ordering produc-
tion. See note 1 sunpra. Hence a court must have at least a rough idea of what the docu-
ments concern before it can even order discovery. It seems reasonable to allow the court
to exercise its discretion again in deciding on exactly what issues the deponent shall bear
the burden of proof. In Socifti Internaiionale, for instance, the court would have no
trouble in inferring that the deponent's business records would contain information about
the corporate ownership.
A court does not deny a litigant due process by placing on him the burden of proving
facts peculiarly within his knowledge and hidden from his opponent. Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413, 418 (1928). A situation where foreign seizure prevents the pro-
ponent from inspecting documents of the deponent would seem clearly to fall within this
rule. The deponent is in a "peculiarly" good position to know the facts which the docu-
ments contain, and the seizure "hides" the contents from the proponent.
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for similar evidence.4° Not only might such an assessment help a proponent
when documents are unavailable, but also fear of the levy should arouse a
deponent into making every possible effort to produce the documents in the
first place. Although these sanctions would not be mandatory or effective in
all situations, courts faced with involuntary non-compliance would have them
available to assure both parties as fair a trial as the circumstances permiL4
40. Under FED. R. Cirv. P. 54(d), costs are generally allowed "as [a matter] of course
to the prevailing party." But under "special circumstances," a court can, in its discretion,
apportion costs differently. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Puget Sound Co., 154 F2d 249, 251
(1946); accord, United Building & Loan Ass'n v. Garnett, 64 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Ark.
1946). Specifically, district courts have the power to award costs to one party and tax
them to his opponent. Swalley v. Addressograph-Mfultigraph Corp., 163 F-2d 583 (7th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949).
In some cases, of course, the sanction might be ineffective because no evidence other
than the missing documents can be found. But that situation would seem to be the
exception rather than the rule. Certainly in Socitj Internatio:ale it seems that the
Government might well have procured evidence of enemy ownership by making investi-
gations in Germany. In fact the deponent alleged that the Government already had such
evidence in its possession. See Socidt Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435,
442 (D.D.C. 1953).
41. Of course, since Rule 37(b) authorizes any order which is "just," see note 2 supro,
a court could also meet deliberate non-compliance by shifting the burden of proof or
apportioning costs, if it seemed equitable to do so.
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